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Ruling
QING FANG VS ZHOU GUO, ET AL.
Aug 29, 2024 |20BBCV00504
Case Number: 20BBCV00504 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: X Tentative Ruling MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES MOVING PARTY: Defendant Guo Zhou RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Qing Fang SERVICE: Filed June 12, 2024 OPPOSITION: Filed August 21, 2024 REPLY: Filed August 21, 2024 RELIEF REQUESTED Defendants counsel moves for Plaintiff to pay attorneys fees totaling $32,025.00, pursuant to a contract between the parties. BACKGROUND This case arose out of Plaintiffs complaint for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. This Court found Defendant to be the prevailing party in the present action after a one day non-jury trial on May 7, 2024. TENTATIVE RULING Defendants motion for attorneys fees is GRANTED in the amount of $29,875.00. LEGAL STANDARD Civil Code section 1717 states in part: (a) In any action on a contract, where the contract specifically provides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce that contract, shall be awarded either to one of the parties or to the prevailing party, then the party who is determined to be the party prevailing on the contract, whether he or she is the party specified in the contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs. [¶] · [¶] (b)(1) The court, upon notice and motion by party, shall determine who is the party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section, whether or not the suit proceeds to final judgment. Except as provided in paragraph (2), the party prevailing on the contract shall be the party who recovered a greater relief in the action on the contract. The court may also determine that there is no party prevailing on the contract for purposes of this section. (2) Where an action has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section. Civ. Code § 1717; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 1033.5(a)(10)(A) (attorneys fees authorized by contract are recoverable as costs under Civ. Proc. Code § 1032). Reasonable attorneys fees shall be fixed by the court and shall be an element of the costs of suit. (Civ. Code § 1717(a).) DISCUSSION A. Entitlement to Attorneys Fees Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of the contract or that Defendant is the prevailing party. Plaintiff instead argues that Defendant is entitled to attorneys fees because of unclean hands. This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs other argument is that the fees should be adjusted downward due to the cases simple procedural history. Neither side litigated any pretrial motions nor were depositions conducted. In this case the Defendant is entitled to recover attorneys fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717. There is a signed contract, i.e., the franchise agreement, between Plaintiff and Defendant that allows the recovery of attorney fees in the event of any dispute between the parties . . . the non-prevailing party will pay the prevailing party all costs and expenses, including attorneys fees incurred by the prevailing party . . . . Motion, Exh. 1 ¶ 20. Judgment was entered for Defendant and thus, Defendant is the prevailing party in this action. B. Amount of Attorneys Fees When determining a reasonable attorneys fees award using the lodestar method, the court begins by deciding the reasonable hours the prevailing partys attorney spent on the case and multiplies that number by the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community who conduct noncontingent litigation of the same type. Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 998; see also Environmental Protection Info. Ctr. v. California Dept of Forestry & Fire Protection (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 217, 248. The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009. As an initial matter, the court finds Defendants counsels hourly rates reasonable (Attorney Hanley $450-500 per hour). Having reviewed and considered Defendants evidence, and having presided in similar cases, the court finds these hourly rates reasonable for attorneys in the community who conduct litigation of the same type as in this case. The court has read and considered Plaintiffs arguments, Defendants arguments, and Defendants counsels invoice (Motion, Exh. 2). Defendant identifies a baseline lodestar of $32,025.00. Plaintiff attacks the billed hours, contending the case has a simple procedural history with no motions and no depositions. The Court considers this argument and finds some time not compensable. First, the Court finds that the time spent on 07/21/2023 for Draft mediation Brief for Court mediation is not compensable because the Court does not see a mediation brief filed by Defendant. Accordingly, $750.00 is subtracted. Second, the Court scrutinizes the time spent on 04/26/2024 for Trial preparation, prepare witness list, exhibit list, trial brief as excessive services as trial preparation matters appeared quite a few times in the invoices. Accordingly, it is not compensable and $1,400.00 is subtracted. In total, $2,150.00 is subtracted. Otherwise, the number of hours is reasonable. Defendants counsel expended those hours over three-plus years of litigation, which included preparation of Defendants answer, discovery, court appearances, conferences, efforts to resolve the case, and trial. The Court awards Defendants counsel $29,875.00 in attorneys fees. CONCLUSION Defendants motion for attorneys fees is GRANTED in part, as follows: Defendants baseline Lodestar: $32,025.00 Removal of unrecoverable items: ($2,150.00) Total Fees & Expenses: $29,875.00 Defendants counsel is awarded $29,875.00. Dated: August 29, 2024 ___________________________________ Joel L. Lofton Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the court indicating their intention to submit. alhdeptx@lacourt.org
Ruling
Regions Bank, an Alabama State Bank Successor by merger to Ascentium Capital LLC vs. Shrinka Investments LLC, a California Limited Liability Co. et al
Aug 29, 2024 |CU23-00998
CU23-00998Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary JudgmentTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff’s proof of service indicates that notice of the instant motion was mailed to thelaw firm Chassman & Seelig, LLP at 1250 Sixth Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401 onApril 24, 2024. Chassman & Seelig was relieved as defense counsel on September 27,2023 upon the filing of proof of service on Defendants of the court’s order grantingwithdrawal. Service on Defendants’ former counsel is not effective service onDefendants.Plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice. Page 1 of 3
Ruling
AARON BOWMAN VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ET AL.
Aug 29, 2024 |23STCV11763
Case Number: 23STCV11763 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 55 Background Plaintiff Aaron Bowman filed a complaint against Defendants Ford Motor Company (Ford), Airport Marina Ford (the dealership), and Doe defendants 1 to 10, alleging that the vehicle he purchased manifested defects, including transmission defects, which Defendants failed to repair or refund. Relevant here, Plaintiff alleges the Fifth Cause of Action for fraudulent inducement concealment (against Ford); and the Sixth Cause of Action for negligent repair (against the dealership). Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings as to counts five and six. Legal Standard A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer and attacks defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 438(d); Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999. In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts consider whether properly pled factual allegations of the complaint, assumed to be true and liberally construed, are sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Stone Street Capital, LLC v. Cal. State Lottery Comn (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 116. Application 1. Whether Plaintiff Fails to Plead All Elements to the Fraudulent Inducement Concealment Cause of Action The required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact. Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 606. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to plead the defect in his own vehicle, instead describing transmission defects that have occurred in other vehicles. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 58. In support, Defendants cite Santana v. FCA US LLC, (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 345, which held that the occurrence of a few defects that & were all fixable, and mostly involved vehicles [plaintiff] did not own, was insufficient to support a jury verdict on fraudulent concealment claim against the vehicle manufacturer. This argument conflates sufficiency of evidence with sufficiency of pleadings. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Ford knew about specific transmission defects in other vehicles equipped with the same transmission model as his vehicle, and that his vehicle manifested transmission defects. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 25, 57-58. Whether Plaintiff can prove Ford knowingly concealed transmission defects or that Plaintiffs vehicle suffered from the same defects are questions of fact. Next, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not purchase the vehicle directly from Ford but from the dealership, Ford had no duty to disclose material facts to Plaintiff. A duty to disclose a material fact can arise (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts. LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336. The latter three require a transactional relationship between the parties. Id. at 336-337. Defendants argument is like one rejected by the court in Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (Dhital), rev. granted Feb. 1, 2023, S277568, which the Court finds persuasive.[1] In Dhital, the court held that at the pleading stage, it was sufficient to show an existence of a transactional relationship (and thus duty to disclose) for plaintiff to allege that they bought the car from the Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty and that Nissans authorized dealerships are its agents for the purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 845. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that he entered into a warranty contract with Ford for the car he purchased. Compl. ¶ 9. Defendants argue that the Court should not consider Dhital because it fails to distinguish Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276 (Bigler-Engler), which held a medical device manufacturer had no duty to disclose. However, the facts of Bigler-Engler are distinguishable. In Bigler-Engler, the plaintiff rented a medical device from her doctor, which she claimed caused serious injury to her knee. Bigler-Engler, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at 286-292. The court, evaluating plaintiffs claim against the device manufacturer for fraudulent concealment, held that because there was no transactional or other relationship between the plaintiff and the medical device manufacturer, there was no duty to disclose. Id. at 312. However, the circumstances of buying a car are widely different from renting a medical device. Doctors are not franchisees of medical device companies, and patients generally do not choose their doctor based on their desired model of medical device. People go to a Ford dealer to buy a Ford, and they generally expect that the dealer is significantly under the manufacturers control. See Daniel v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (noting that auto manufacturers communicate with their consumers through their dealerships). Moreover, unlike the medical device manufacturer in Bigler-Engler, Ford had a direct transactional relationship with Plaintiff insofar as it made express warranties regarding the car. Based on the automaker-dealership relationship and Fords express warranties, the Court concludes that Ford had a transactional relationship with Plaintiff, imposing a duty to disclose material facts. Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs fraud claim fails to plead Ford had exclusive knowledge of material facts. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Ford knew the vehicles suffered from defects that could cause the transmission to experience hesitation and/or delayed acceleration; harsh and/or hard shifting; jerking, shuddering, and/or juddering. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 57, 58. Plaintiff further alleges that Ford acquired this knowledge through various sources of information, including but not limited to pre-production testing, pre-production design failure mode and analysis data, production failure mode and analysis data, early consumer complaints made exclusively to Fords network of dealers and directly to Ford, aggregate warranty data compiled from Fords network of dealers, testing conducted by Ford in response to consumer complaints, and repair order and parts data received by Ford from Fords network of dealers. Compl. ¶ 26. The complaint alleges sufficient facts to set forth a duty owed by Ford to disclose known defects, and that Ford purposely withheld disclosures from consumers, including Plaintiff. These allegations are sufficient to plead fraud by concealment. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to fraudulent inducement concealment. 2. Whether the Economic Loss Rule Prohibits the Fraudulent Inducement Concealment Count The economic loss rule provides that, [i]n general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted purely economic losses, meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage. Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (quoting, Southern California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 400). Furthermore, it requires a [contractual party] to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can demonstrate harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise. Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 988 (Robinson). In Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 988, the court explained the application of the economic loss rule to an intentional tort, specifically fraudulent misrepresentation, in the performance of a contract. The court found that a parts supplier who falsely certified the parts were manufactured according to contract specifications was liable in tort as well as breach of contract. Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 991) Because [the supplier]s affirmative intentional misrepresentations of fact (i.e., the issuance of the false certificates of conformance) are dispositive fraudulent conduct related to the performance of the contract, we need not address the issue of whether [the supplier]s intentional concealment constitutes an independent tort. Ibid. Again relevant, is Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 828, review granted Feb. 1, 2023, S277568. There, the court held, plaintiffs claim for fraudulent inducement by concealment is not subject to demurrer on the ground it is barred by the economic loss rule. Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 840. As the Dhital court noted, the logical follow on from the Robinson courts analysis in the context of an affirmative misrepresentation claim is that concealment-based claims for fraudulent inducement are not barred by the economic loss rule. Id. at 840. The California Supreme Court granted review of Dhital and deferred further action pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Rattagan v. Uber Tech. Inc., S272113. Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2023) 304 Cal.Rptr.3d 82. Therefore, the Supreme Courts recent decision in Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Aug. 22, 2024, No. S272113) Cal.5th https://supreme.courts.ca.gov/opinions/recent-opinions (Rattagan), is highly relevant.[2] Though it does not resolve the specific issues raised in Dhital, the court held, a plaintiff may assert a cause of action for fraudulent concealment based on conduct occurring in the course of a contractual relationship, if the elements of the claim can be established independently of the parties contractual rights and obligations and the tortious conduct exposes the plaintiff to a risk of harm beyond the reasonable contemplation of the parties when they entered into the contract. Rattagan, supra, at 54 (emphasis added). Moreover, the courts discussion of the economic loss doctrine strongly suggests it does not apply to claims of fraudulent inducement by concealment. The court notes it has long been the rule that where a contract is secured by fraudulent representations, the injured party may elect to affirm the contract and sue for the fraud. Rattagan, supra, at 47 (quoting, Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court rejects the argument that fraudulent concealment should generally be treated differently from affirmative misrepresentation but acknowledges unique aspects of a claim of fraudulent concealment related to a contractual performance. Id. at 43 (emphasis added). Because parties may contractually impose a duty of disclosure during performance or waive existing obligations to disclose, the economic loss doctrine may apply to fraudulent concealment that occurs during performance of a contract. Id. at 48-49. The court must determine if the parties reasonably contemplated and accounted for the risk of nondisclosure before entering into the agreement. Id.at 49. If the risk of nondisclosure was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, the doctrine applies, and the injured party may only seek economic damages for breach of contract. Ibid. Because Rattagan is clear that the economic loss doctrine has greater application to fraudulent concealment during contract performance than inducement to contract, the Court is persuaded that Dhital correctly held that the economic loss rule does not apply to a fraudulent inducement concealment claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to fraudulent inducement concealment. 3. Whether the Economic Loss Rule Prohibits the Negligent Repair Count In Sheen, supra,12 Cal.5th at 922, the California Supreme Court analyzed the application of the economic loss rule to services and held it barred a borrower from pursuing tort liability against the bank regarding seeking a loan modification because the plaintiffs damages arose from the mortgage, rather than an independent duty. Id. at 930. The court distinguished professional cases in which a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary duty exists from ordinary commercial contracts. Id. at 929. Here, the dealership owed Plaintiff no other duty than that imposed by their contract. Therefore, the economic loss rule applies. Plaintiff argues that even if the economic loss rule applies, the complaint does not state his damages were limited to economic losses. Plaintiff argues that the economic loss rule does not bar recovery in tort for damage to a vehicle caused by negligent repair of a component. This argument fails because nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that the dealerships negligent repair of the transmission caused damage to the vehicle, only that it failed to repair it. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the economic loss rule bars the negligent repair cause of action. The Court grants Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the negligent repair count with leave to amend. 4. Whether Plaintiff Fails to Plead Damages Where the Repairs Were Allegedly Covered by Warranty Even if the economic loss rule did not bar Plaintiffs negligent repair cause of action, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support his claim for negligent repair. Plaintiff alleges that the repairs were covered under Fords written warranty and does not allege that he paid any out-of-pocket expenses for the repairs. As mentioned above, Plaintiff fails to allege that the failed repair caused any additional damage to the vehicle. Accordingly, he fails to allege damages, a necessary element of negligence. See County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 318 (The elements of a negligence cause of action are duty, breach, causation and damages). Conclusion For the reasons given above, the Court denies Defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings as to count five and grants it as to count six with 20 days leave to amend. [1] As a published opinion pending review, Dhital may only be cited as persuasive authority. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1). [2] The Court is mindful of the fact that the parties did not have the benefit of this opinion in drafting their arguments.
Ruling
EMSURGCARE, ET AL. VS UNITEDHEALTHCARE INSURANCE CO.
Aug 29, 2024 |24STCV08181
Case Number: 24STCV08181 Hearing Date: August 29, 2024 Dept: 76 Plaintiff medical providers seeks quantum meruit reimbursement for emergency medical services rendered to Defendant health care service plans insured. Defendant UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company demurs to the Complaint. TENTATIVE RULING Defendant UnitedHealthCare Insurance Companys demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED as to the first and only cause of action. Defendant is to answer the Complaint within 10 days. ANALYSIS Demurrer Requests For Judicial Notice Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: 1. The Plan attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Jane Stalinski (Stalinski Decl.) filed in Support of Uniteds Notice of Removal at Dkt. 1-3, when this case was pending in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, setting forth the status of certain business records related to a welfare benefit plan under which Plaintiffs claim reimbursement, which is referenced in paragraphs 3, 13, 15, 17, and 27 of the Complaint. A copy of the Stalinski Decl. and Exhibit A thereto is filed concurrently hereto as Exhibit 1. 2. Exhibit A to the Slaught Decl., which sets forth correspondence from the Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC), the regulatory agency responsible for the oversight and enforcement of the Knox-Keene Act, which confirmed that UnitedHealthcare Insurance Company is not a Health Care Service Plan, nor licensed to be a Health Care Service Plan, nor is it subject to the Knox-Keene Act. A copy of this DMHC letter is filed currently hereto as Exhibit 2. 3. Exhibit B to the Slaught Decl., which sets forth publicly available information from the DMHC, which proves that United does not have a license with the DMHC. A copy of a printout of this publicly-available information is filed currently hereto as Exhibit 3. Request Nos. 1 3 are DENIED, as they are being offered for the truth of hearsay statements contained therein without establishing that exceptions to the rule against hearsay apply. The motion judge took judicial notice of the declarations filed in these three cases, but not of the truth of their hearsay contents. The ruling was correct. The hearsay rule applies to statements contained in judicially noticed documents, and precludes consideration of those statements for their truth unless an independent hearsay exception exists. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Judicial Notice, § 25, p. 119.) (North Beverly Park Homeowners Assn. v. Bisno (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 762, 778 [bold emphasis added].) Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following: Exhibit 1: Emsurgcare et al. v. Avery Hager et al. Case No. 2:24-cv-02243-AB-PD, Ruling of The Honorable Judge Andre Birotte Jr., United States District Court for the Central District of California, on August 8, 2024, finding that UnitedHealthcare Oxford could be a health care service plan even if it has a license with the Department of Insurance and does not have a license with the Department of Managed Healthcare. The request is DENIED. The Court cannot accept the truth of the facts recited in the federal district court opinions. (See Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) Meet and Confer The Declaration of Katheleen Cahill Slaught reflects that Defendants counsel satisfied the meet and confer requirement set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 430.41. Discussion Defendant UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company demurs to the Complaint as follows: 1. First and Only Cause of Action (Quantum Meruit). Defendant makes the following arguments: A. The Knox-Keene Act is inapplicable. Defendant argues: United confirmed that it is not a Health Care Service Plan within the meaning of the Knox-Keene Act. (Declaration of Kathleen Cahil Slaught, ¶ 3.) United provided Plaintiffs counsel with additional, conclusive proof from the Department of Managed Health Care, which confirmed that United is not subject to the Knox-Keene Act. (Id.) United has also previously put Plaintiffs on notice of the exclusionary language in Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1343(e)(1), and the fact that United maintains an active license with the California Department of Insurance. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.30, 430.70). The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action [citation]. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905 [200 Cal. Rptr. 497].) (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) The Court has denied Defendants request for judicial notice of the truth of the matters asserted in the extrinsic evidence presented by Defendant. As such, the argument based on such evidence is not persuasive on demurrer. Defendant will have to bring a motion for summary judgment in this regard. Moreover, the Court cannot accept the truth of the facts recited in the federal district court opinions cited by Defendant. [W]hile courts are free to take judicial notice of the existence of each document in a court file, including the truth of results reached, they may not take judicial notice of the truth of hearsay statements in decisions and court files. ( Citation omitted.) Courts may not take judicial notice of allegations in affidavits, declarations and probation reports in court records because such matters are reasonably subject to dispute and therefore require formal proof. (Citation omitted.)The underlying theory of judicial notice is that the matter being judicially noticed is a law or fact that is not reasonably subject to dispute. ( Citation omitted.) By making an order establishing the law of the case, it seems that the facts are no longer in dispute and can therefore be considered true as set forth in an order, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. (Citation omitted.) Such facts would not be the proper subject of judicial notice. (Ibid.)The appropriate setting for resolving facts reasonably subject to dispute is the adversary hearing. It is therefore improper for courts to take judicial notice of any facts that are not the product of an adversary hearing which involved the question of their existence or nonexistence. (Citation omitted.) A litigant should not be bound by the courts inclusion in a court order of an assertion of fact that the litigant has not had the opportunity to contest or dispute. (Ibid.) (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) B. Plaintiffs quantum meruit claim is expressly preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Defendant argues: Plaintiffs state law cause of action in the Complaint relates to the administration of the ERISA-governed Plan. See Goel v. UHS, 2024 WL 1361800 at *5-6 (finding that each of Plaintiffs claims were preempted by ERISA); see Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Ins. Co., 2024 WL 2801531 (9th Cir. May 31, 2024); Dedicato Treatment Center, Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 2024 WL 3346241 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2024) (same). Plaintiffs quantum meruit claim is expressly preempted. However, whether Plaintiff administers an ERISA-governed plan which is the subject of this lawsuit, and whether it is a self-funded employee benefit plan, are evidentiary questions outside the scope of this demurrer. Under the deemer clause, a state law that regulates self-funded ERISA plans, even if it regulates insurance within the meaning of the saving clause, is not saved from preemption. (FMC Corp. v. Holliday (1990) 498 U.S. 52, 61 [112 L. Ed. 2d 356, 111 S. Ct. 403] (FMC).) A self-funded employee benefit plan does not purchase an insurance policy from any insurance company in order to satisfy its obligations to its participants. (Id. at p. 54.) (Coast Plaza Doctors Hospital v. Blue Cross of California (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1189.) This ground is not persuasive on demurrer. Defendant will have to bring a motion for summary judgment in this regard. C. Plaintiffs Complaint lacks factual allegations to state a cognizable cause of action. Defendant argues that ERISA preempts Plaintiffs quantum meruit claims. Defendant only cites non-binding federal cases holding this, but California case law recognizes that quantum meruit is permitted under the Knox-Keene scheme. Further, as discussed below, the applicability of ERISA to the subject plan is beyond the scope of this demurrer. Thus, as this court and others have previously observed, the Knox-Keene Acts statutory and regulatory scheme contemplates that private actions under a quantum meruit theory may be used to recoup appropriate reimbursement for services rendered. (Citations omitted.) (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1044.) This ground for demurrer is not persuasive. The demurrer to the first and only cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendant is to answer the Complaint within 10 days.
Ruling
STUDIO ESTATES, LLC VS NINE ELEVEN MOVIE, LLC, ET AL.
Sep 03, 2024 |22STCV04713
Case Number: 22STCV04713 Hearing Date: September 3, 2024 Dept: 52 Tentative Ruling: Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLCs Motion for Attorney Fees Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLC moves for an order awarding it $17,003.50 in attorney fees against defendants Nine Eleven Movie, LLC, Martin Sprock, and Sprockefeller Pictures, LLC. In September 2023, the parties executed an agreement to settle this action. (Trauben Decl., ¶ 3, Ex. A.) The agreement includes two provisions stating that a party who prevails in an action to enforce it will recover reasonable attorney fees. First, paragraph 7 of the agreement provides, The Parties agree & the Court in the Action will retain continuing jurisdiction over this Action for the purpose of enforcing any and all terms of this Agreement, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 664.6. Any breach of this Agreement shall be subject to appropriate relief, as determined by the Court, and any Party may institute an action with the Court for enforcement of any provision of this Agreement. In the event of any action for breach of and/or enforcement of this Settlement Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover his/its reasonable attorneys fees and costs relating to their claim for breach and/or enforcement of this Agreement by 664.6 motion. (Trauben Decl., Ex. A, p. 3.) Second, paragraph 18 of the agreement provides, In the event that any action, claim, petition, pleading or motion for enforcement of this Settlement Agreement becomes necessary, the prevailing party will be entitled to recover its/his attorneys fees, costs and expenses incurred therein, including, but not limited to, in connection with any Party having to file any action, claim, petition, pleading or motion to enforce the terms of this Settlement Agreement. (Trauben Decl., Ex. A, p. 5.) In April 2024, plaintiff brought a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 to enter judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. On May 29, 2024, the court granted plaintiffs motion and entered judgment for plaintiff. Plaintiff prevailed on a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and is therefore entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred for bringing the motion. Plaintiff did not reasonably incur all $17,003.50 in attorney fees it claims. In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the court ordinarily begins with the lodestar, that is, the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each task was reasonable. (Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 775, 793.) Plaintiffs counsel submitted a declaration attesting to the accuracy of his firms billing records. (Trauben Decl., ¶¶ 18-23, Ex. C.) The bill, however, includes time plaintiffs counsel anticipated spending on future work. The declaration of Michael A. Trauben states, I have spent 6 hours drafting, researching, filing, and serving this motion and anticipate spending another 4 hours on the reply brief, and another 2 hours preparing for and attending the hearing on this motion. (Id., ¶ 23.) Defendants did not file an opposition. Plaintiff did not file a reply brief. Considering there was no opposition, preparing for and attending the hearing should only reasonably take 1 hour. The court will therefore reduce the award of attorney fees by 5 hours at $595 hourly, resulting in a total of $14,028.50. Disposition Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLCs motion for attorney fees is granted in part. Plaintiff Studio Estates, LLC shall recover $14,028.50 in attorney fees from defendants Nine Eleven Movie, LLC, Martin Sprock, and Sprockefeller Pictures, LLC.
Ruling
Regions Bank, an Alabama State Bank Successor by merger to Ascentium Capital LLC vs. Shrinka Investments LLC, a California Limited Liability Co. et al
Aug 31, 2024 |CU23-00998
CU23-00998Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary JudgmentTENTATIVE RULINGPlaintiff’s proof of service indicates that notice of the instant motion was mailed to thelaw firm Chassman & Seelig, LLP at 1250 Sixth Street, Santa Monica, CA 90401 onApril 24, 2024. Chassman & Seelig was relieved as defense counsel on September 27,2023 upon the filing of proof of service on Defendants of the court’s order grantingwithdrawal. Service on Defendants’ former counsel is not effective service onDefendants.Plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice. Page 1 of 3
Ruling
Jakob Laggner, et al vs Beau McKeon
Aug 28, 2024 |23CV01626
23CV01626LAGGNER v. McKEON MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL - UNOPPOSED The unopposed motion to be relieved as counsel filed by Jacqueline Simonovich isgranted as it complies with California Rules of Court, Rule, 3.1362. Ms. Simonovich is directedto submit an updated proposed order for the court to sign with the correct upcoming hearingdates. The proposed order before the court indicates a future date of August 20, 2024.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 1 of 1
Ruling
34-2023-00335758-CU-BC-GDS
Aug 27, 2024 |Unlimited Civil (Breach of Contract/Warranty) |34-2023-00335758-CU-BC-GDS
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2023-00335758-CU-BC-GDS: Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation vs. Earth First Builders 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Answer in Department 54Tentative RulingMoving party states the incorrect address in its Notice of Motion and does not provide notice ofthe Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). The correct address forDepartments 53 and 54 (Law and Motion) of the Sacramento County Superior Court is 813 6thStreet, Sacramento, California 95814. Moving counsel is directed to contact the opposing partyforthwith to advise it of Department 54’s correct address, Local Rule 1.06, and the Court’stentative ruling procedure. If moving counsel is unable to contact the opposing party prior to thehearing, they shall be available at the hearing in the event the opposing party appears withoutfollowing the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).Plaintiff Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Strike the Answer of Defendant EarthFirst Builders, Inc. (“Defendant”) is unopposed and is GRANTED.This action arises out of the alleged breach of a rental contract for construction equipment.Plaintiff filed the Complaint on March 7, 2023. On May 22, 2023, the law firm CardinaleFayard, APLC filed an Answer and Cross-Complaint on Defendant’s behalf. On January 29,2024, Cardinal Fayard filed a motion to be relieved as defense counsel, which the Court grantedon April 16, 2024. Cardinal Fayard served the Court’s order on Defendant the same day, April16, 2023. To date, Defendant has not retained another attorney to represent it.Plaintiff now moves pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 436 tostrike Defendant’s Answer on the basis that Defendant is not represented by counsel and cannotappear in the action in propria persona.CCP section 436 authorizes the Court, 'in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper,' to'strike out... any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state.' Defendantis a California corporation. Although a corporation has the capacity to sue and defend, it is not anatural person, and therefore cannot appear in an action in propria persona or through an officeror agent who is not an attorney; it can appear only through counsel. (Caressa Camille, Inc v.Alcoholic Bev. Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101.) A motion to strike is aproper vehicle to attack a pleading by a corporation that is not represented by counsel. (See, e.g.,CLD Constr., Inc. v. City of San Ramon (2004) 120 CaI.App.4th 1141.)As stated above, the Court granted Cardinal Fayard’s motion to be relieved as Defendant’scounsel on April 16, 2024, and the Court's electronic register of actions does not reflect anappearance by any replacement counsel for Defendant to date. Defendant has made no showingto the contrary.Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendant’s Answer is granted and its Answer isstricken. Plaintiff may file the Request for Entry of Default it attached as Exhibit C to its moving Page 1 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2023-00335758-CU-BC-GDS: Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation vs. Earth First Builders 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Answer in Department 54papers.This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)NOTICE:Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on thiscalendar must comply with the following procedure:To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law andMotion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before thehearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requestingparty shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oralargument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument;and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and thatopposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If norequest for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely eithertelephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with noticeto the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Althoughremote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely fornon-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 53/54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear onZoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NOCOURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporterservices at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules ofCourt, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy forOfficial Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website athttps://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved OfficialReporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-13.pdf.A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to besigned by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using areporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Page 2 of 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO 34-2023-00335758-CU-BC-GDS: Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation vs. Earth First Builders 08/28/2024 Hearing on Motion to Strike Answer in Department 54Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiverand requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party witha Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearingor at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerkwill forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. Page 3 of 3
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